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By Paul Bloom & Barbara L. Finlay (Editors)
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Extra info for Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Volume 32, Issue 2, April 2009
Sample text
Indeed, we can learn much about ourselves by observing our own behavior: for example, after playing a round of golf, we decide we are not quite ready for the pro tour. , ease and speed) with which it comes to mind (Schwartz et al. 1997). Given the way we, and many other cognitive psychologists, define metacognition, we assert that it is likely that metacognition and mindreading are separate processes. The argument that one should only see metacognition in species that can mindread is, to the best available evidence, false.
Of course, the failure to translate personal access into the idiom of subpersonal computations may be the result of the relatively rough sketch of the subpersonal mechanisms that are responsible for metarepresentation. No doubt, a complete account of metarepresentation would require an appeal to a more intricate set of mechanisms to explain how subpersonal mechanisms can construct “the self” that is represented by the personal stance (Metzinger 2004). As Carruthers notes, the mindreading system must contain a model of what minds are and of “the access that agents have to their own mental states” (sect.
How does the “mindreading is prior” model account for such differences in the mindreading mechanism, solely based on the perceived similarity of others to oneself? Finally, in our own work, we find that even in ASC the mechanism underlying mentalizing about self and similar others may be different to mentalizing about dissimilar others (Lombardo et al. 2007). , honest, caring, anxious) in relation to themselves, a similar close other, and a dissimilar non-close other. In a control task, they were asked to simply count the syllables in personality trait words.